

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET				
INSTRUCTIONS				
PRIOR TO FILING			TO: ACTION BRANCH	
1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.			If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.	
FROM:  RID/   WH/4 REGISTRY			PROPER FILE NO.   TO: ALL ADDRESSEES FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE COMMENTS	
TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED	
1. WH/4 REGISTRY		29 MAY 1961		3/1
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4. WH/4/CE		17 AUG 1961	18 AUG 1961	Done
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16. WH/4 REGISTRY				
17. RID/FI				
TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT <del>XX</del>		FILE TITLE 19-120-13 DRS
		INDEX		FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) <del>19-120-18</del> 19-120-13
DATE MICROFILMED		DOCUMENT DATE		DOCUMENT NUMBER
		25 May 61		UFGA 01647

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Mr. (Simmons) - this is the Bonfacio Herrera 81 wave 6543 (2711) on who you requested data in Bell 0935 (9871).  
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DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION SECRET		PROCESSING	
		PROPOSED	ACTION		ACCOMPLISHED
TO	Chief, Western Hemisphere Division		MARKED FOR INDEXING		
INFO.			NO INDEXING REQUIRED		
FROM	Chief of Base, JMWAVE		ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING		
SUBJECT	Debriefing of Bonifacio HERRERA Fernandez aka "Bony" and "El Guajiro"		ABSTRACT		
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			MICROFILM		
<p>None - for information and files</p> <p>1. Subject arrived in Key West by fishing boat from Cuba on 20 May 1961. He was brought to the WAVE area the same day and debriefed rapidly because he reported the existence of a plot to kill Fidel CASTRO during the week of 21 May. His story follows.</p> <p>2. Subject was born 12/16/35. He was raised in Oriente Province where his parents were owners of two small fincas. He has a brother named Victor Vidales HERRERA. After his father's death a few years ago his brother sold one of the fincas and he stayed on with his mother at the other. This was a finca of 16 caballerias known as Las Gordas. He worked the finca and also collected fresh milk for a dairy.</p> <p>3. About 4 November 1958 Subject came to the U.S. but was refused admittance, allegedly because he refused to ask for asylum because he interpreted asking for asylum at that time as being in favor of Fidel CASTRO. On 9 February 1959 he began revolutionary activity with a small group affiliated with the <u>Movimiento Democratico Cristiano</u>. One <u>"Cucho" FLEITES</u> was his first chief. Another person in this group was one Jose FADUL who now lives at 435 Winthrop Street, Westbury, New York.</p> <p>4. During 1960 and 1961 he worked in both Havana and Oriente. He eventually came under the command of a Dr. <u>(SIERRA)</u> who was chief of the underground in Holguin. He organized a group in Tunas who were prepared to go into combat upon the receipt of arms. These men were organized into 16 smaller groups.</p> <p>5. In early 1961 Subject met SORI Marin, the military coordinator of the Unidad Revolucionaria, while in hiding in the same house in Havana. SORI later went to the U.S. to coordinate military plans and to arrange for the delivery of arms. Part of the arms were to be delivered to his group in the Puerto Padre area.</p>					
<p>CS copy 19-120-13</p>		<p>DATE TYPED per DRS 22 May 1961</p>		<p>DATE DISPATCHED</p>	
<p>CROSS REFERENCE TO</p>		<p>DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-1647 UFGA 1647</p>			
<p>CLASSIFICATION SECRET</p>		<p>HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER</p>			

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6. In March 1961 SORI, Rafael, and Francisco were arrested as the result of information furnished to G-2 by one Captain BERMUDEZ who was working under SORI and supposedly in command of a group of guerrillas in Pinar del Rio. BERMUDEZ has now infiltrated another guerrilla group in Quivaron. Subject tried to organize a raid to break SORI out of the military hospital but his plan was betrayed to G-2 by somebody on the hospital staff. After the arrest of SORI an (Englishman) named (Bob GEDDES) took over the job of arranging for arms deliveries. The deliveries to the Puerto Padre area were scheduled several times but delayed each time for various reasons. The final date was set for the week after the invasion.

7. When the air attack on Havana came on 15 April the militia took control of the streets by nine o'clock in the morning and further movement was impossible. Three key men were arrested immediately in the initial round-ups that were made by the militia. This was a general sweep in which they picked up anybody on the smallest grounds of suspicion. Subject escaped by hiding for two days in the apartment of the Interventor of the Havana motion pictures theaters. The Unidad Revolucionaria had some arms but only five magazines of ammunition for each gun. Some members of the group were in favor of beginning to fight even with these limited arms, but they were dissuaded because of the impossibility of moving people or materiel through the streets.

8. A large number of the key people in the Unidad Revolucionaria were arrested or went into asylum during the next few days. (Bob GEDDES) was arrested about 19 April on the basis of an accusation from the manager of the Hotel Capri where (GEDDES) was staying. Subject was given this information by the (two telephone operators in the hotel) who worked for the UR. 24

9. Subject learned that five or six of his group leaders in Tunas were arrested in the initial round-up but they were later released. He believes that the organization in that area is substantially intact. He believes that the UR was badly damaged in Havana but that it is still functioning. He says that the MRR and various smaller organizations are practically destroyed. He believes that a small group called the Martianos have some assets left, but they cooperate with the UR.

10. Subject was offered the opportunity to get out of Havana by paying two thousand pesos for which he could get a false passport with an American visa and a ticket on one of the airlines. He said that he strongly believes that this is a racket organized by the Cuban G-2. It not only gets them a lot of money but also gives them a chance to smoke out people that they are looking for. Finally he arranged to leave Cuba via fishing boat. He had to hide under one of the seats until the boat was safely out of the harbor.

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11. Just before his departure, Subject's chief in the UR, one<sup>06</sup> (Manuel RODRIGUEZ<sup>06</sup>) who goes under the name of (Luis LOPEZ,) tried to persuade him to stay because RODRIGUEZ knew of a plot to capture or assassinate Fidel CASTRO during the week of 21 May.<sup>06</sup> There were supposed to be six "Comandantes" and eight civilians in the plot. They were all people placed close to CASTRO, and they had access to the keys to the arms depots throughout Cuba. It was their intention to open these and give arms to anybody willing to take them. They hoped by this means to provoke a general uprising. Subject said that he had had enough of such plots. He felt that if this one didn't come off right away it wouldn't come off at all, and that he was too hot to stay in Havana any longer to wait for it.

12. Subject said that Ramon FONT who works with Alberto FERNANDEZ of the Tejana was a member of the UR now in Miami who could confirm his identity and role in the underground in Cuba.

13. In commenting on his experiences in the recent past Subject said that from the standpoint of the underground the invasion came three or four weeks too soon. Not enough people had received arms to enable them to engage in combat. He also said that if they had received some warning of the air attack they would at least have been able to get ready to use the arms they had. As it was they were completely paralyzed. He believes that now it is very difficult to hide or transport arms and that in any future uprising the delivery of arms will have to be more or less simultaneous to all groups and will have to take place at the time that we want the uprising to begin. The groups can be organized in advance and the places for the arms deliveries selected, but the actual delivery would have to be done in the manner described.

14. He knew of a UR leader named<sup>06</sup> (JUSTO<sup>06</sup>) who was supposed to be a very capable man. He did not know if (JUSTO<sup>06</sup>) was still at liberty or not.

END OF DISPATCH

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